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Poor Citizens

Social Citizenship and the Crisis of Welfare States

GIOVANNA PROCACCI

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Poor Citizens
Social Citizenship and the Crisis of Welfare States

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Introduction

The history of citizenship is coterminous with the political history of modern western societies. The very idea of political representation opened a wholly new need to define the status and the political role of the people whose sovereignty did legitimize the power of representatives. Thus the concept of *citizen* ended up incorporating the main characters of the political transformation. Consequently, the concept has been particularly receptive of all changes in strategies affecting the state and its relations to society. From the original concern about membership--by way of defining who has the right to be acknowledged as a member of a society and the constitutional forms of such a right--the notion of citizenship has undergone the same modifications than the very content of the social pact. Here lays indeed the strength of T.H. Marshall's theory of citizenship. His reconstruction of citizenship's development--from civil to political and to social--shows a dynamics inherent to it, stronger than the rigidity of a strictly legal pattern of citizenship. Based on the evolutionary character of his model, citizenship has been often viewed in the sociological literature as nothing but a synonymous of modernization, democratization, and the like. To be critical of such evolutionary simplifications does not demand, however, to give up the idea of citizenship as a process of political transformation itself.

If citizenship is a process, more than a right, then it becomes all the more indispensable to reason on historical cases, since the components and rhythms of a transformation are not the same all over. As Turner [1990] claims, only historical analysis can lead to a theory of citizenship. A second need is equally strong: the analysis cannot be done through the juridical language alone, because this latter accounts for the codification of rights, but cannot explain the deeper dynamics through which rights and the social pact itself do change. Ferrajoli [1993] rightly deplores the lack of communication between legal and sociological analyses of citizenship, but at the same time he seems to overlook the fact that the modification of rights is a social, not merely a legal process. To the vagueness of the sociological literature on modernization and democratization, legal theorists tend to oppose a rigid definition of citizenship in its original meaning of membership into a political community [La Torre, 1995], as though such community--and consequently membership to it-- had not undergone significant, strategical changes.

A way of interpreting citizenship which would avoid both, evolutionary generalizations and disciplinary oversimplifications is offered by the approach in terms of *governance*--the *art de gouverner* that Foucault described through the

analysis of bio-politics [Foucault, 11979]. Citizenship can be described as a strategy to govern processes of social change affecting political relations--namely a strategy to socially create citizens [Burchell,1995]. Burchell stresses that thinking of citizenship as a *social creation* may help to avoid the oppositions dominating citizenship debates--between active and passive, public and private, bourgeois and citizen, community and the market. All these oppositions may at their best generate attempts to restore a better meaning of citizenship lost somewhere in the past, destroyed by the market and modern specialization. But they cannot account for "the key feature of modern Western citizenship seen as a product of self- and social discipline" [Ibidem:549].

What is even more relevant here is a further effect of the governmentality approach. It makes clear that citizenship is *always political*. The political nature of citizenship is not confined only in a peculiar step, when at stake are political rights; nor it is essentially visible through its juridical codification. Rather citizenship is political because it responds less to a need of just classifying people, than to a strategy of creating citizens through a set of practices and knowledges that governmentality does mobilize. Thus, citizenship and citizenship rights do not limit themselves to express membership ties. They move along with changing conditions, expectations, criteria required for practising the role of citizen.

The marshallian case, out of British welfare history, is relevant because it brings on the table the case for *social citizenship*. Presented on an evolutionary scheme, however, social citizenship appears as being both, of the same nature than political citizenship, and yet non-political nor state-related. And indeed it has been often regarded as being rather the product of social actors, social movements, the equivalent of civil society sphere, and the like. I claim that the analysis of citizenship as governmental strategies in the development of French republic will prove, on the contrary, that social citizenship is deeply political and state-related; even more so, it has changed the whole relation to the state--via the administrative apparatus--as well as the whole definition of a good citizen. The treatment of poverty as a *social question*--where citizenship sustain the duty of the poor to participate but is in turn challenged because of their exclusion from rights--is the first political example of such strategical use of citizenship to govern problems of inequality, and at the same time the source of crucial transformations in the social pact.

Social citizenship is nowadays under attack, consistently with attacks against social policies, social services and social rights. Similar attacks play on its claimed non-political nature: on one side, this maintains a sort of illusion that

social citizenship could be eroded without breaking the social pact; on the other side, reasons for such an erosion are allegedly only economic reasons, coming out of financial crisis of western states. This is particularly clear in the current debate on poverty. On the one hand, the issue of poverty is presented as *politically neutral*, just a matter of organizing market responses enabling to reduce public expenses. On the other hand, poverty tends to be identified with extreme poverty, the most excessive deprivation, a group apart where no rights are involved, rather only humanitarian concern. As a result, poverty is isolated from social problems of inequality and becomes *social exclusion*, while social rights and social institutions are generally weakened.

Part of the problem comes from the fact that current debate on welfare policies relies mostly on the analysis of the American welfare model and its crisis [Leibfried, 1990]. This sort of "americanization" of European poverty analyses and social policies [Abrahamson, 1991] is particularly problematic from the vantage point of social citizenship. If European welfare systems have grown out of a political link between poverty and citizenship, opposing to an exclusively juridical liberal conception an argument for social citizenship[1], by contrast in the United States a strong reluctance toward universalistic principles of social citizenship has created a "partial welfare state" characterized by the exclusion of large groups from social rights [Schmitter-Heisler, 1991].

The debate on citizenship, in turn, seems more willing to analyze problems raised from cultural differences and identities than issues of inequality addressed by social citizenship. The emphasis on 'multiculturalism' as the most crucial dimension of citizenship issue might well be the effect of a pressure from conjonctural policy-making demands. It still limits citizenship issues to civil and political rights, and stresses an interpretation of citizenship as a political relation to the nation-state. No doubt, enlarging or restricting membership acknowledgement is an important issue for minority groups; but recognition policies so popular in today citizenship debate cannot address inequality problems that such groups will experience still [Fraser, 1995]. The social dimension of citizenship seems out of date; even though its unconcern with national ties could prove useful in strategies of integrating minority groups. In the end, the dominance of cultural obscures equality concern in citizenship debate,

[1]Freeden [1994] shows for Britain that the concept of citizenship came into play around the debate on the Old Age Pension Act at the beginning of 20th century, modifying a dominantly statistical interpretation of poverty by stressing its intrinsic social nature. A similar process had been taking place much earlier in France given the Revolution's emphasis on citizenship.

reducing the critical strength of social citizenship against the political limits of liberalism.

In this paper, I briefly describe how poverty and citizenship issues have been associated in France, within the frame of a general emphasis on citizenship since the Revolution of 1789. Then I shall draw on the historical case some developments toward a definition of social citizenship, both at the theoretical level (social rights) and the institutional level (welfare state), as a crucial aspect of our democracies. This should help to evaluate current analyses of the welfare crisis.

In a general way, nowadays attacks against welfare seem aimed to exorcize exactly that fundamental transformation from individual poverty toward a social question which had been influenced by citizenship issue and had organized social policies. After decades of welfare policies based on social citizenship, current attacks tend to undermine the idea that welfare would have any relation to citizenship, being in any way part of the social contract. The very idea of social citizenship is under a twofold line of attack: by strategies individualising anew problems of poverty, and by strategies individualising social risk. At stake, in this process that M. Rébérioux [1994] has called *décitoyenneté*, is something we had thought had been solved once for all: are the poor still citizens, or not? And the doubt goes either way: aren't citizens becoming poorer because of an erosion of social citizenship? The frailty of citizenship of the poor today is symmetrical to fragilisation of social citizenship for everybody. After all, it is no wonder, since "the history of citizenship entitlements is a history of freedom and not a history of compassion "[Ignatieff 1989].

PART 1

Citizenship And The Social Question In France.

At the turn of 18th and 19th century, the poverty debate in France shifts from mendicity to a "social question" as an important effect of the passage from the Old Regime to a liberal society. Between the mendicant haunting the Old Regime and the modern poor, the contrast is striking: the poor are no longer individuals, but "dangerous classes", the collective phenomenon of pauperism. What was once accepted as a sign of divine will, if not of election [Gutton 1974], and regarded as a stimulus to charity with no implications for any system of

public obligation, now seems to be morally unacceptable. Even worst, poverty appears as a symptom of broken social ties.

Of course, the poor did not suddenly stop begging for food, nor did the Revolution break an essentially repressive policy toward mendicancy and vagrancy. On the contrary, in spite of strong opposition against hospitals and hospices, the institutions put in charge of them remained surprisingly the same [Rosanvallon 1990]. The "dépôts de mendicité" were to enforce work among mendicants, while the 1810 Napoleonic Law defined mendicancy and vagrancy as crimes; assistance, in turn, relied mostly on private charity [LeRoux 1907:52]. Notwithstanding the persistence of an old institutional apparatus, after the Revolution neither mendicity nor repression no longer exhausted the problem of poverty. Beside a traditional poverty surviving beyond the Revolution, poverty took on a new importance, rapidly turning into one of the greatest public questions. Why did poverty become a crucial issue to reflect on the bases of sociability, instead of simply bringing up to date assistance and repression institutions? What fundamental changes took place in the political rationale of poverty?

In my book on *Gouverner la misère* [1993] I have argued that such a shift in the conception of poverty did take place within the frame of a political transformation expressed by the concept of citizenship, eventually overcoming the universe of charity and repression which had been in charge of dealing with poverty problems during the Old Regime, typically with mendicancy and vagrancy.

As it is well known, the concept of citizenship was at the core of theoretical and political elaborations which were at the background of the French revolution. Citizen is above all *l'homme libre* [Condorcet], free to take part in the *grand tout national* [Sieyès], that is to *participate* [Rousseau] to the sovereign authority. Freedom, common rights and active participation are the crucial features of a citizen, against the political subordination and the pervasiveness of privilege in the ancien-régime society [Brubaker:39]. In the revolutionary language, the title of *citoyen* took the symbolic aspect of the destruction of social orders and the privileges attached to them in the Old Regime society. It became a general attribute, practically synonymous of human being. Yet it was adding an important dimension to it: namely, that the moral person was no longer built neither against, nor independently from its social side, rather together with that condition of sociability that the city represents.

Within a literature on citizenship largely dominated by the British case, through the crucial work of Marshall, the French case is most usually referred to

because of its strong link to the building of the nation-state. Therefore it is most often treated under the aspect of political citizenship. Brubaker [1992] stresses the national character of French citizenship through the revolutionary institutionalization of political rights as citizenship rights, transposed to the plane of the nation-state. In France, Rosanvallon [1992; 1994] emphasizes abstract equality as the specific content of citizenship in the French model; by doing so, he interprets the Revolution through a fundamental separation of politics from social demands and burdens. Yet, I believe Turner is right [1990:208] when he says that the very fact of going through a revolutionary process against the absolutist conception of sovereignty provided France with a highly articulated concept of citizenship, especially of active citizenship.

At the core of the concept of citizenship, alongside with membership in an abstract general state against corporate privileges, is a second element of a very different nature since it is to qualify the membership tie: *useful work*, as in the case of the producers who constitute the nation according to Sieyès. In his analysis of private activities as well as of public services, the nation coincides with the Third Estate only because his legitimate members are all individuals who carry the productive activities the nation needs. Such a moral central role of useful work is confirmed *a contrario* by the blaming of aristocracy, excluded out of the nation because of their idleness, and of course, symmetrical to it, of mendicancy and charity. If their attachment to privileges makes it difficult to imagine that aristocrats will ever be able to belong to the general state, useful work will redeem the poor transforming them into "useful and virtuous citizens", re-establishing a reciprocity of duties.

Useful work provides a criterium of citizenship without any other reference than the individual and the nation. It breaks therefore the image of a spiritual community, hierarchically organized and unified in the king's body, toward a society constituted as a nation of equal individuals, associated under the same laws, all committed to transform natural goods into consumption goods, for the greatest benefit of all. Utility becomes the very basis of morals, as the source of a right no longer based on forceful superiority. As Koselleck has shown, it is only through a moral legitimation that new claims against political despotism can be fostered. This demands that society is able to promote its own morals, to limit despotic political power. Thus the citizen becomes the depositary of such a moral consciousness rooted in social processes, as opposed to individual egoism. "L'esprit de citoyen", Turgot had already stated, was equivalent to the "noble passion d'etre utile aux hommes".

In the conceptual strategies of the revolutionary destruction of old privileges, citizenship is eventually the very plane of equality, the only one where equality is really thinkable of. It expresses the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of the association, above all the guarantee that all natural rights will be equally protected against the natural inequality of means. Reciprocally, only the equality of all citizens does legitimate the sovereignty of the nation. Yet, the concept of citizenship is caught in a fundamental contradiction due to its juridical origins.

On one side, citizenship is a universal attribute, a natural right of all members of society. According to Sieyès, citizens owe their right to influence collective decision to their common nature of citizens, and not to their differences, this is why he identifies them with the *chose publique*, the outcome of the common will of citizens. Universal citizenship is the political side of popular sovereignty.

On the other side, however, citizenship was never working politically otherwise than through distinctions, starting with the first distinction between active and passive citizens offered by Sieyès. Only as passive citizens all members of the nation share a natural right of citizenship; but citizenship as a set of positive rights opening the way toward "exerting an influence over the making of the law" is only the fact of active citizens. Of course, active citizens are a small minority: women, children, foreigners but also the poor are excluded. As a matter of fact, the notion of an active citizen eventually coincides with *citoyen propriétaire*, or *actionnaire*, a stock-holder in the business of society. If it is thus formally impossible not to be a citizen, the notion of citizenship is far from conveying a univocal meaning of membership. It tells that we are all members of the nation, but also that we are not all members in the same way. From this vantage point, citizenship is no longer a crucial means to attack privileges, it rather belongs to an attempt to organize new hierarchies, a new order of privileges.

Sewell [1992] points at the paradoxical figure of passive citizen: since the idea of French people becoming active participants in the public life is at the core of the notion of citizen as opposed to the subject, a passive citizen is a non-sense. In fact, it is a way to repropose subjects, whose passivity is the reverse of required qualities for active citizens: to be male, adult, French nationals and taxpayers[2]. As we see, it would be only too simple to explain these exclusions by

[2]Sewell analyzes the gender-based exclusion of women, and concludes to the "limited democratic vision of the Revolution's first generation of leaders" [1992:121]. The same could be said about the exclusion of the poor, that Robespierre denounced as the real aim of introducing passive citizenship. But there is more to say than denouncing a limited democracy--and after all, "limited" by which standards?

opposing within citizenship a formal level of equality to a factual level of inequality, as Rosanvallon tends to suggest. The contradiction is indeed internal to the very notion of citizenship, and this is what the treatment of the poor is to make clear. Under the new light of citizenship, the poor do not represent any longer marginal people excluded from society, but on the contrary these margins are the borders of inclusion. All are citizens, even the poor, morally autonomous individuals, subjects of indefeasable rights which sanctioned the end of privileges. It starts then to spread a concern about the role that the poor can play, or refuse to play, in a social game where they are necessarily included, since nobody can be excluded, though they will have the worst part. If the poor become a critical political issue for the new liberal society it is not so much for the inequality they are suffering but *because they are equal to everybody else* and it cannot be otherwise.

The new figure of poverty raises two kinds of problems for a liberal order. First of all, its link with economy: if poverty depends on the lack of labor, then policies to reduce poverty should inevitably intervene on the labor-market, therefore denying the neutrality that a free market economy demands to the state. Secondly, its link with rights: if labor is the only legitimate way out of poverty, then everybody is entitled to have an opportunity to work, and such entitlement should be protected as the rights to ownership. Yet this would make the state not only an economic actor but even politically responsible for a deficit of work; should the social contract include a guaranteed individual entitlement to labor, the state would increase its dependence upon popular consent. In such links with the economy and the rights lay the political intensity that poverty problems assume in a liberal society.

Social policies thus were organized following a strategy of depoliticization of poverty problems: protecting market and the state from interference and responsibility, by means of separating the issue of poverty from the issue of labor and of individual rights. To this purpose, the analysis of poverty focuses on the moral element promoted by philanthropy in the space opened between the crisis of classic economy model and the need for political legitimation of liberal order. It inspired a fundamental distinction: if poverty belongs to indefeasable laws of economy and is therefore ineliminable, a totally different question is *pauperism*, a less economic than moral kind of poverty that social reform ought to eliminate in order to re-establish a natural relation between wealth and poverty. Pauperism was a set of a-social habits and behaviors to be attacked by techniques of socialization [Villermé 1840].

All techniques directed to moralize the poor did intervene in the relation between poverty and the whole social body. It was by this relation that they judged what was moral or immoral. They did not seek for individual solutions, rather for an effect of socialization. Association, education, providence, mutualism, hygiene, were all aimed at producing social ties between individuals, in order to produce some cohesiveness, and therefore social stability. Poverty was described as a *social pathology*: health was identified with order, poverty with illness and immorality with contagion. It was to be stopped controlling the space surrounding the individual, where physical circumstances for moral improvement become effective. Immorality appeared as the fertile ground for the diffusion of social disorder and absolved social injustice. In this way, moral analysis of poverty was to influence significantly the administration of civil society--through Boards of health, direction of mines and factories, schooling, banking and the like [Lecuyer 1975].

The moral analysis of poverty assumed that the state had to be defended from an obligation toward the poor, as much as society from a danger of disorder. To this purpose, it emphasized the need to investigate the actual conditions underlying morality, enlarging thus its scope well beyond the narrow limits of the responsibility of the poor, rather using intervention on them as a way of moralizing the whole society. But the "moral interest" of society in reducing poverty [De Gérando 1839] referred to a moral collective rather than a contractual one enabling to acknowledge the indispensable role of the state in promoting socialization. Both effects lead beyond the subjective analysis of poverty and at the same time start to investigate into its social character.

The moral analysis of poverty however proved insufficient to depoliticize poverty problems, as the new revolution in 1848 was to show dramatically. In their claim for a "social republic", insurgents linked poverty to labor, and any solution to it to the acknowledgement of an individual right to labor and assistance. After all strategy of moral interpretation, poverty was regarded as linked to the economic and juridical bases of social system. The moral analysis was eventually only a provisional step toward a social analysis of poverty, and moralization turned into a large project of socialization. The political response to the revolutionary claims was to call for an authoritative foundation of social morality, more obligatory than voluntaristic moral ties. It was a call for social science.

The lack of "social sentiment", Auguste Comte said [1975, 2:659], demanded to promote a sociability that it would be vain to expect from laws and rights, or from work. This is why to the "vague and tempestuous discussion about

rights", purely individual, he counterposed the "calm and rigorous determination of social duties", directly social [Comte, 1848]. Moral stood then for 'social': social reform must promote social sympathy, "by beneficially transforming questions of rights into questions of duties". The Comtian concept of *duty* would organize morality in the "scientific phase", as the individual counterpart of scientific laws of society. Strategic distance between the moral and juridical interpretation of society's committments lay thus on more stringent bases than philanthropic ones. Social science elaborated on the moral element, in order to found assistance on an objective system of laws and social justice, instead of a subjective sentiment of charity. From the "moral duty" of society the way was opened toward the "social duties" of its members, replacing their individual rights, providing a social, non-juridical content to their citizenship.

As Henry Monod [1909], a Third Republic director of Public Assistance, put it later, either assistance was deemed a duty, or it was just a "virtue" of the state. The Republican creed considered assistance as a duty, and took over the task of transforming that conviction into a legal and institutional framework. Third Republic social laws at the turn of the century identified the social question with workers, work site and labor conditions, rather than poverty. To be sure, they responded in this way to a growing fear of the conflict between capital and labor, which was rendering state intervention in labor market and relations more acceptable to many [Stone, 1985]. But more crucial to my perspective, they were to overcome the opposition between the rights and duties in a framework of social obligations regulated through a mechanism of social insurance. Socialization was promoted socializing risk and responsibility [Ewald 1986]. By acknowledging that a gap between individualistic and solidary principles was active in transforming liberal societies, these laws eventually laid the bases of the modern institutional set of social services in contemporary France.

PART 2

Toward A Definition Of Social Citizenship

a. Social Citizenship And Social Rights

A social analysis of poverty came through In France little by little, by reacting to difficulties of individualism: charitable, economical and juridical. The individualistic interpretation of poverty was left behind, as social laws and rights

were promoted, an administrative state apparatus and the social sciences. A new field of policies, institutions and sciences was then promoted, *the social*, offering a framework to treat poverty separately from its economic implications (the labor question) and from conflicts about individual rights. Its task has been to provide a rationale for governing problems of inequality in a society of equals.

Welfare policies arose from a strategy to stabilize economy and political power, well before than to improve the well-being of the poor, and they did so by de-politicizing conflicts related to inequality. Inequality was interpreted as a problem of socialization, the underpinnings for an administrative state were provided, individuals were inscribed in a framework of collective duties transforming citizenship regimes. But also modern democracies were deeply transformed by such changes: social welfare policies greatly modified relations to the state and between state and economy, denouncing liberal principles' insufficiency and enhancing democratic practices. I would like to use here the origins of French welfare policies in order to deeper investigate Marshall's theoretical definition of social citizenship.

Citizenship emerges progressively against medieval orders, contributing to a transition toward a social structure centered on individuals as subjects of rights. Modern contract is the key to its construction: it is characterized as an agreement between individuals rendered free and equal by their status of citizens. But civil rights regulating contracts are not enough against inequality; even more, they are affected by inequality in so far it may create obstacles to the realization of the autonomy of the subject. They are indispensable to the functioning of a market society, but unable to assure it from the disfunctioning due to inequality. Civil contract provides the egalitarian foundations supporting the structure of social inequality. An equal juridical capacity cannot eliminate the need to act on the social structure in such a way as to effectively guarantee individual autonomy against the limits raised by social environment. Here lay the conditions for the dynamics of Marshall model: citizenship is only partially linked to civil rights, they only represent the contractual bases on which a social dimension of citizenship is taking shape.

We know the historical context in which his attempt was formulated: Marshall's intention to support social-democratic turn toward welfare state. Yet, the idea that in order to be a citizen of a *polis* and to fully participate in public life one needs to be in a certain socio-economic position has been largely shared. It is already in Tocqueville and in Stuart Mill. The traditional notion of citizenship is not independent of social and economic concerns. There are various grounds to this: from the valorisation of individual independence to concern with inequality

as a source of instability, to the awareness that desperate need does interfere with deliberation, to the search for solidarity as a cohesive link among members of a society.

Marshall first stated in a systematic way that modern democracies have elaborated on such awareness, developing a specific citizenship regime, based on social rights. There are resistances to acknowledge that it is a citizenship issue at all. Massimo Latorre [1995] challenges the idea that social rights such as the right to education, to medical assistance, to a fair compensation and the like, have anything to do with citizenship. Given the fact that he defines citizenship merely as the legal status of membership in a political community, it follows inevitably that such rights do not belong to the field of citizenship. Yet, is it possible to define the citizen without referring to education? How and when education became an essential feature of the citizen, to the extent of being shaped in terms of a right and a duty? Furthermore: how did the right and duty of education change the nature of citizenship and the practices of citizens? These are all questions that legal theorists seem simply to reject as corruptive of the concept of citizenship, instead of trying to conceptualize the changes occurring in citizenship regimes.

This only deepens the need to define social citizenship. Part of the difficulty to do this comes from the evolutionary character of Marshall's model, presenting different forms of citizenship on a continuum. Given the dominance of political citizenship, one tends to deduce social citizenship from it--as though the same concept of citizenship was applied to social matters instead of political matters. As already noted, this might wrongly suggest that social citizenship is not political. Nor the reference to the community would be specific to social citizenship: citizenship itself, no matter how qualified, is characterized by an orientation toward the public space, a space not claimed by private ownership [Crouch, 1996; Somers, 1996].

Let try, then, to characterize social citizenship by defining the *social rights* on which it is grounded. Marshall regarded the 1834 poor law reform as alternative to a recognition of rights of citizens, because the reform did renounce to interfere with the functioning of free market (by means for instance of intervening on the wage system). Thus, also the residual relief to the poor was given only on the condition that the poor would give up their rights as citizen (internment in the work-house). Charity as well as work-houses were practices opposite to citizenship. So, what draws the line of an intervention on poverty based on a principle of rights is *interference with the market*: social rights

acknowledge that the market value of an individual is not the measure of his right to welfare.

Second feature. Marshall characterizes social rights, with respect to personal rights, as being *public duties*. Although a person is eventually enjoying the right, the aim really pursued through it is an improvement of society. His classical example is education. Compulsory education is according to him a genuine social right: the public duty of education does not only aims the benefit of the individual, but the benefit for the whole society. "Political democracy and scientific manufactures needed an educate electorate" [82].

French example provides an illustration of such a social character of rights. *Social* means that society is the legitimating reference, not social actors. A political process affecting the relation to the state is originated neither at the state level, nor at the level of individuals, but at the society level. It is what P. Costa calls a "sociocentric paradigm" in his discussion of citizenship historical models [1996]. This requires that society is established as a subject of demands, needs, interests that are not identifiable with the ones coming from the state or the individuals; that society is acknowledged as the space where specific, necessary and involuntary processes take place. Something similar to Polanyi's account for what he calls "the double movement" of society.

The problem is that such a subjectivation of society was a long process taking shape through anti-contractualistic, anti-individualistic tensions in the institutional organization of a liberal society. Society was established as an autonomous field of knowledge and practices, vis-à-vis economic and juridical ones as the result of a deep criticism of the possibility to deduce parameters to organize the common good from the contractualistic premises of liberal order. It is not just the market which cannot really work without some kind of protections; but society as a whole. Inequality problems are specifically apt to show this impasse, because of their difficulty to be governed in a society based on principles of equality. Because here lay a tension crucial to liberal democracies. In Marshall's formulation, social citizenship is a strategic answer to the conflict between a democratic orientation toward equality of rights, and capitalism valorization of inequality: at stake is the need to find a politically viable way toward a legitimized inequality.

Historically, the formalization of a status of citizen has been always challenged by attempts to reduce inequality, namely by poverty as a social question. The difficulty then is not external to the field of civil and political citizenship, which would work well for their part; it is inside citizenship itself, that is inside the relation of individuals to the state, that difficulties are nested.

Citizenship as a unifying concept is not only contradicted by the exclusion of the non-citizens, but has never worked otherwise than through distinctions, internal borders separating different categories of citizens, as we have seen with Sieyès concepts of citoyens actifs et passifs. Sewell lists four levels of citizenship in the Constitution of 1791 he had deeply inspired [1992:112]. Functional exclusions only work at some conditions: that excluded people accept to be excluded, that they are entirely excluded--and cannot exert any influence on decisions establishing their exclusion, that they do not have other important functions. Once the social structure of inequality starts to be challenged, also political citizenship gets into crisis. When in 1848 Parisian people claim for "rights as citizens and rights as workers", they show to consider the political status of citizenship as being different from the social status of laborers--and they claim that both are equally essential to their membership in the Republic. Actually, this dissociation was not only in the claims of workers, but also in the political response to them: they got rights as citizens (universal manhood suffrage) in order to deny them rights as workers--the right to vote instead of the individual right to labor or to assistance. It would be naïve to suppose that this did not in turn affect citizenship. The very extension of political rights modified the frame, and claims grew against the neutrality of liberal order asking for some policy of rights reducing inequality.

From the Physiocrats' tradition of "natural social right" (*droit social naturel*) to Condorcet, it is already at stake the need for some synthesis between the liberal conception of individual rights and the anti-contractualistic idea that society is necessary and involuntary--two possible sources of rights. Universal individual rights interpret equality and liberty, but are unable to organize the social unit since they cannot afford to regulate disintegrating levels of inequality. In a word, they fail to realize security. As a reaction, the search for security (to secure the realization of people's autonomy as well as to secure the survival of the association) has inspired a continuous attempt to re-establish a reciprocity between rights and duties, as a way of limiting the scope of rights in the interest of society. *Qualitas personae* is not enough to found the association.

Social rights address strategically this problem of founding society on a balance of rights and duties. They have therefore a very specific logic. Consider work. A distinction can be made between on one side the "droit de travailler", stating the freedom of working, a negative guarantee, and on the other the "droit au travail", the right to get the possibility to work, a claim for a service, for a positive guarantee. Now, if such a claim for positive services is the core of the social rights' logic, their nature is incomparable with subjective universal rights: they do not ask for more freedom from state power, they are not incompatible

with state intervention in assuring services. Above all, their legitimacy springs from two different sources: the individual and the society. There is thus no progression from civil and political rights to social rights, there is more than just a discontinuity, there is a real rupture, and such a rupture takes place within rights. And in fact in France the political resistance of liberals against the acknowledgement of duties, of positive guarantees and the like has been strenuous, from the Declaration of Rights during the Revolution throughout most of XIX century.

Critics of Marshall evolutionistic approach point at the fact that social rights **are not** of the same nature than civil and political rights. Such criticism can be addressed from a legal theory point of view, as Ferrajoli does [1994]: social rights are expectation rights, as opposed to autonomy rights: they present a substantial legitimation and call for a substantial democracy. They are not attributed to the citizen, but to the person, with a few exceptions--that we should try to further dissociate from citizenship, making all of them rights of the person. Once again, citizenship, for legal theory, is only substantiated by national belonging. The most problematic characteristics of social rights are the low level of procedural definition, and therefore of uniformity, and the high level of economic expenses they usually require. This put social rights under a critical light: they are too dependent on economic and political resources in order to keep up requirements of certitude and non-contingency. They are, for this reason, *no rights*, as Zolo puts it: they might indicate necessary social services, but they cannot transform into **real** rights -- i.e. universal rights -- any sort of entitlement to such services. So, critics claim that talking of citizenship about social rights would be illegitimate, since they have not the same normative strength of civil and political rights. They have not reached the state of universal rights, what the notion of citizenship would refer to; for this reason, the very notion of social citizenship would be nothing but confusing.

Yet distinctions do not prevent from governing through some strategical compositions. Take Ferrajoli distinction between civil rights concerning the person and political rights concerning the citizen, according to the legal definition of citizenship. Yet, we can account from a sociological point of view for the existence of a link between the two sorts of rights--that takes the form of the contract. Not only in the sense that the practice of political rights is conceived as a contractual relation; but also because the political contract is based on the same principles than the civil contract, namely liberty, equality and security (Procacci, 1994). Civil and political rights might well be distinct in legal terms, they nevertheless do interplay in government strategies: thus, political rights are

reserved only to citizens able to fulfil the conditions for civil contract. The difference of social rights from civil and political rights can also be described in strategical terms, as their historical construction shows, leading to another conclusion than they just are no rights. Their different nature might have modified or broadened the scope of rights beyond the limits of liberal legal conception. And today's problems of citizenship are indeed very hard to understand unless we take such a broader perspective.

Then, social rights are not just another category of rights added to civil and political but introduce a rupture in the field of rights. They have not only a compensatory, but also a legitimating function, they shift the claim for distributive justice from the state toward administrative agencies. During the French Third Republic, when social laws establishing social rights come along, they emerge mainly from an insurance principle translating them as "socialization of risk": individuals are entitled to social provision not as individuals, as though they could pretend to more *qualitas personae*, but as a member of an aggregation, of a collective body, by profession, by age, etc. The absolute character of universal rights is here replaced by the relative character of circumstances influencing the social life of people, such as accidents, old age, sickness. Strategy of social rights reinforces the intermediate institutions and weakens the state, in a very durkheimian perspective. They show that the complexity of the relation to the state cannot be expressed by the voluntaristic logic of the political contract, nor by an exclusively political notion of citizenship referred to it. We simply need not to reduce social theory contribution to indicate procedural ways of solving tension between contrasting principle at work in democracy, as sometimes it seems the case (Habermas). Procedures tend to replace only too often substantive reasoning and historical judgement in contemporary thought about democracy. Soc. rights have been much more that a procedural solution to the political tension between individual self-realization and social conditions to it; they have substantively opened a full new political space, becoming a stake for a continuous process of collective fighting.

Looking at social citizenship as a political strategy might help to understand some of the reasons why it is not too popular among today acknowledged problems of citizenship--namely, why it is underestimated with respect to multiculturalism problems. Interestingly enough, social citizenship is typically a citizenship status where nationality does not count--the tie has already been broken. It is somewhat surprising then that multiculturalist strategies overlook possibilities to use social citizenship. The reason lay, in my view, in the fact that historically social citizenship has resulted from a movement (theoretical,

political and social) of deep criticism against the political limits of liberalism; whereas today's horizon of multiculturalism debate is deeply committed within the liberal order, limiting its criticisms to claims for a more open, more tolerant liberal society--that is for extending the same pattern of liberal citizenship. And second benefit of underestimating social citizenship: by doing so, we reduce not only citizenship, but also inequality to such extension of an established model of social stratification, referring problems mainly to relationships among societies, or cultures, rather than to internal systems of power hierarchies.

I do not mean that social citizenship was the revolution, rather exactly the opposite. It has represented a compromise solu'ion, a sort of third way between pure liberalism (thinness of the laissez-faire) and socialist statism (thickness of state intervention). From this intermediate position, it has challenged liberalism, which was thus historically forced to cope with it. To treat citizenship only as a continuum with its contractualistic origins, as it is nowadays often the case, and to ignore changes occurred within citizenship itself, can only be an attempt to eliminate such challenge from the political construction of our societies.

b. Social citizenship and welfare

Welfare services constitute the institutional component of social citizenship. At the opposite of poor laws, welfare policies are based on the idea that assuring a minimum of well-being is not only necessary, but it demands to interfere with the functioning of free market, by substracting to it some goods provided under the form of public services. 20th Century rights to education, health and social protection are opposed to early practices and embodied in institutions based on the principle of expanded responsibility and shared risk.

Citizenship-based provision of welfare services means that living standards are assured to all members of the social community. Selectivity had connected services to resources, inspiring means tested access to them, provoking hostility and stigmatization of recipients as being inferiors. By contrast, citizenship-based welfare services are universal, avoiding stigmatization, supplication, and exposition to official discretion [Parker, 1975]. This has meant enhancing the quality of the services provided (since they do not concern only the poor but all people), and more importantly opening to legislation the definition of standards, therefore giving to citizens the possibility of influencing choices and decisions. In this way the development of welfare systems has deeply transformed contemporary democracies, namely eroding the pervasiveness of market criteria to regulate social solidarity. It has transformed the role of the state, the relations between state and economy, the nature of social conflict.

Thus, citizenship has expanded. It does no longer consist only in national belonging and political participation, but tends to coincide with all aspects of what means to be member of a given society. The right to welfare has become an essential part of citizenship as such, just as property and vote rights, integral to our sense of belonging [King & Waldron, 1988]. Even more, citizenship has become itself expandable: M. Freedland [1996] has argued that social citizenship is determined to a significant extent by the nature and the character of public services provision. Welfare services are no longer a matter of relieving the destitute as for the poor laws, they rather build a system of expectations drawn on standards of values independent from market.

Marshall's normative reason to associate welfare to social citizenship is less redistribution of income than *equalization* of status among citizens. We have seen, speaking about social rights, that equalization tends to reduce inequality to a legitimized level by strengthening, through equal access to common services, practices where people experience equality of status. There are other possible grounds to it, as we have already mentioned: assuring stability, organizing solidarity, etc. The important point is that all reasons ought to be others than the ones offered by both, the market and charity, against which welfare systems were originated.

We have seen that, among the three conditions for the realization of individual's autonomy, security was problematic. That security also means a minimum economic security has always been clear, since poverty has appeared to be an obstacle to realization of autonomy and therefore an obstacle to the realization of a market society of free subjects, it is clear. Civil and political citizenship did not ignore the problem; it was solved by denying citizenship to those who had no independent socio-economic positions [vonGunsteren, 1978:29], that is, by exclusion. Once exclusions start to be challenged, and political citizenship to expand, new relations and new definitions of citizenship are looked for. If one does not exclude anyone but treats all as citizens, then the conditions for independence required by the status of citizenship become a public concern.

From this vantage point, citizenship has offered to welfare policies a more efficient frame than the market, allowing the realization of non-marketable services aimed to generalize acceptable living standards. Citizenship restores reciprocity outside market rules, where it is regulated by an exchange between money and services, and outside family relations, where it is regulated by mutual-aid. But of course also outside charity, where there is no reciprocity at all. This demands that society has acknowledged that some standards of living are

required, "irrespective of individual bargaining power" [Parker, 145]. To formulate these standards in terms of rights does transform the dependencies that they try to solve into autonomy.

Despite all this, debate about the crisis of welfare states is nowadays dominated by the logic of economic rationality: within a resurgent market and monetarist approach, privatization of social services and "user-pays" philosophy seem sufficient to ground an essential rejection of welfare systems based on social citizenship rights. Yet, many authors notice that attacks on welfare have had so far little success, no matter how loudly advertized, and this can plea for the structural position that welfare has reached in our political systems and citizenship regimes. However, the basic logic of these attacks is rarely challenged, and is becoming a sort of popular truth. The political reasoning is reversed: inefficiency of universal rules. This leads to approach a general crisis of social regulations denying the need to find new ways of organizing social solidarity. Yet there is no evidence that non-universal services would enjoy more consent than universal ones.

Although it would be difficult to deny that welfare is in trouble everywhere, part of the problem comes from the dominance in the current debate on welfare crisis of the American model of welfare. In fact, Americans' refusal to acknowledge structural poverty [Gilbert 1983] has always limited the political impact of the social question. Built on "the stigma of receiving unearned benefits", American welfare never went beyond a "residual" conception, as Titmuss [1987] put it, of the public intervention in assistance matters, to temporarily replace such "natural" solutions as market and family. Even when the Great Depression revealed the need of a public intervention to replace voluntary company programs, contributory welfare programs were reminiscent of private welfare, they explicitly rejected any goal of income redistribution [Quadagno, 1984], and eventually substantiated a firm distinction between social security paid by workers and welfare given to the poor [Skocpol, 1988]. The "undeserving poor", a moral category expressing the degrading nature of relief within American poverty discourse, was never eradicate by universal programs of social security [Katz, 1989]. In fact American welfare has mostly dealt with social *dependency* rather than inequality.

As such, American welfare model has been quite different from the combination of full-employment policies, social security and assistance measures that Beveridge regarded as essential to a welfare state. Such a distance has only grown since the Second World War [Fano, 1988]; Korpi's distinction between a marginal and an institutionalized pattern of welfare systems proves still useful to

evaluate it [Korpi 1983]. The tendency nowadays to claim no contradiction between liberalism and welfare [Welch, 1989] encouraged by the success of Rawls does introduce even greater confusion. Nevertheless, welfare systems did not follow on a linear path out of that "utilitaristic sympathy" which was the liberal key to social justice. On the contrary, they required an autonomous system of values. As A. Sen puts it, social welfare is not a function of individual achievement [Sen 1986]. And "self-sufficiency welfare" represents just a misdiagnosis of the crisis of welfare [Goodin 1988].

As Fraser and Gordon [1994] remark, social citizenship is practically out of use in the contemporary debate about welfare in the US. This is because of an opposition to acknowledge entitlements to social provisions, in the American culture social provisions remain largely outside the aura of dignity surrounding citizenship, and recipients of welfare are usually regarded with disrespect, stigmatized. Welfare has been more generally viewed as a threat to citizenship, rather than its realization. They suggest that this is the result of an overwhelming emphasis on civil citizenship, and within it, of an unlimited predominance of the contractual model, increasingly assimilating all forms of reciprocity, except for family ones. Such an hegemony of contract also means that all what cannot be assimilated by it is described as its exact opposite--i.e. unreciprocated charity. The US conception of welfare rests on this binary logic opposing contract to charity, which is at work in the distinction between contributory insurance programs and non-contributory public assistance, masking the fact that also public assistance is based on contributions--the difference being the way they are collected. According to this ideology, the current trend pushes toward assimilating welfare to contract, with forms of agreed obligation for the recipient to perform work or training activities. This is the result, the authors claim, of the absolute mythology of civil citizenship.

Yet, we tend to think too often the content of civil citizenship as exclusively natural. In fact, although not an economic concept, the very basis for citizenship to regulate inclusion and exclusion has been, alongside with the national tie, "useful work", useful to the Nation--as we have seen from the French case. This is also the reason why the poor have raised a problem; they could not be integrated through their active contribution. In fact the contract, as the central pattern for civil citizenship, refers explicitly to the restructuring of work relations under a free market model [Castel 1995]. It does demands not only habits and virtues, as Veit Bader says [1996] but above all work--a peculiar virtue, to say the least.

We do not need to recall Karl Polanyi's all story about what he called the "double movement" of societies, compensating market with non-market institutions. But it is important to remind the work-and-market content of social citizenship, as to investigate relations between citizenship and welfare. This is not an undue extension of an exclusively juridical concept to socio-economic matters. Citizenship itself is a more complex concept, having a juridical definition shaped on a social form of labor relations, and therefore a socio-economic application and relevance. Social citizenship is then expressing all what could not go under the contractual form of citizenship, non-contractual compensations indispensable for a market-oriented citizenship to function. In this way, it means that the relation to the state in our societies is by no means only a juridical and contractual relation, but a much more complex one.

Reduction of citizenship to contract cannot be the only normative ideal of citizenship. There are people for whom this normative ideal might just be too difficult to match; therefore, this argument can only lead to a bipolarization of people between the ones who are able to take advantage of destructuration of our systems of social protection, and those who cannot profit of it and will only experience being in a more vulnerable position [Castel 1995].

The conjunction of welfare with citizenship has been the motor of a transformation of welfare, leading from a traditional paternalistic paradigm where government defines welfare needs, to a social rights paradigm where a new consumer based community voice may emerge to determine needs [Culpitt, 1992]. Social citizenship enhances public action, and presents citizenship as a way of acting, more than a way of being. This is also why it can be dissociated by nationality, because it is related to public activity rather than to a moral quality. Welfare services often need to be better organized; what they do not need is to loose the crucial role of citizenship at the center of modern political debates on socio-economic arrangements in order to enhance participation.

PART 3

Social Citizenship Under Attack

a. Individualisation of poverty: are the poor still citizens?

The socalled crisis of the welfare state is nowadays putting into question not only the extension, but also the maintenance of social citizenship institutional setting. The political argument has been reversed and a fundamental doubt seems to surround nowadays practices of social rights: rather than favor the realization of citizenship by eliminating the burdens of poverty, they might impede it by keeping the individual in a situation of subordination, simply by participating into a system of social protections.

Current analysis of poverty, particularly under the influence of the US debate, does contribute in a substantial way to breed such a skepticism toward social citizenship institutional provisions. From a cultural-biological emphasis in conservative analyses, to an insistence on the condition of ethnically delimited inner-city ghettos in a more progressive perspective, we assist to the conjunction of different conceptual strategies. Rooting the origins of poverty in the character or the biology of the poor, replacing identified targeted groups of population by an indistinct category as poverty, identifying the all of poverty problems with the extreme form of a growing marginalization, all are ways of individualizing problems of poverty and denying their collective nature. In this way, current analysis of poverty ends up to put into serious question something which had appeared as granted all the long of the realization of welfare institutions: namely, that the poor are citizens just as everyone else, and have therefore the right to some standards of living considered essential to the relation of citizens to their society.

In the present sociological debate on poverty, we assist to a regain of economic analysis. Economic versus social interpretation of poverty helps to vanish the idea that poverty can be referred to universal standards of economic, social and cultural well-being to which everyone is entitled. Poverty does not seem to be any longer a social problem but the result of an individual choice. Arguments against welfare take a revolving way, more than welfare a "revolving door".

Poverty is most often treated as an absolute phenomenon of a statistical nature, settled upon a *poverty line* based on the cost of a food basket, eventually bringing the analysis back to economic data, usually referred to income distribution. Among other difficulties to establish criteria for defining the poverty

line, a critical point is that income or consumption data do not account for social implications of poverty: not only the exclusion from material welfare, but also the social degradation confirming the idea of a common nature between poverty and delinquency. At best, economists can argue about income deficiency and suggest income transfers even though, as A. Sen forcefully shows, the loss of income do not capture the main problems of being left without a job. They cannot propose long term antipoverty policy, since they do not consider inequality the consequence of economic and political power distribution within a society. They can only provide more or less adequate, but always contingent, responses to a problem of poverty which is not considered as a political problem.

The big role played by economics has left the space for recasting the social analysis of poverty in a subjective frame, sustaining interpretations of poverty origins in terms of *culture of poverty*. On one side, poverty has very little to do with income, as C. Murray says. The "working poor" [Murray, 1987] he is searching does not exist, only because he assumes that there is no labor-market problem, not there should be any responsibility of it in creating poverty, if only one is ready to work hard. The point is that work here stands for a "work ethic", something like "an opportunity to join the nation's mainstream" [Reischauer, 1987]. Not to work is classified as a "rebellious" and a political action, from a work-ethic state enforcing competitive work [Kaus, 1986]. Symmetrical to such "culture of work" is a "culture of poverty". M. Katz [1989] shows how this concept born in the 1960s to express liberals' attempt to escape moralizing classification of the poor, was in fact embedded with middle-class culture standards and in the end failed its purpose. The poor were described as passive, just as in the tradition of the "undeserving poor", and then kept apart from movements fighting for civil rights. Teenage pregnancy, family patterns, reluctance to work, propensity for drug use and crime are only features of "passive poverty in the inner city" to whom welfare works as another "addiction": to accept welfare is thus an unequivocal sign of "incompetence" of the poor to self-support [Mead, 1991]. The idea of individual responsibility of the poor is forcefully revived: the poor are "making choices", Murray says. Moral, ethnic or cultural, consideration of the "characteristics of the poor" means centering the analysis not on work, but on the *work-motivation* of poor people. In this way, poverty is separated from labor problems, especially unemployment.

As a matter of fact, according to the conservative critique arguments on the subjective culture of the poor should explain social inequality better than any structural hypothesis about labor. Fox Piven and Cloward [1972] have already shown that in the 1960s' reforms the responsibility for poverty was systematically

blamed on the poor. Today critics go a step further: "government must persuade [the poor] to blame themselves" [Mead, 1986]. While one can object that there are no assured means to persuade the poor or to influence their characteristics, it is important to stress that individual responsibility of the poor is not a wrong response, it is just a response that excludes social policy, and therefore increases the 'risk of poverty' within our affluent societies.

A reaction against both, the increase of poverty and the reduction of it to cultural problems has led more recently to emphasize concepts like *underclass*, today dominant in poverty debate, where the structural components of poverty due to de-industrialization are put forward. If only "hors-statuts", drop-outs and the like are the dominant poverty problems, only people representing the extreme point of an inequality process already at work in fact well before such an extreme state, poverty becomes the target of policies only aimed to restore locally some kind of "human" condition.

Born as a purely economic concept, indicating the persistence of poverty in spite of after-war economic growth, it has acquired new meanings: to the temporal dimension originally characterizing it, a behavioral and a racial dimension were added mainly through its mediatization, identifying it with blacks and to a lesser extent hispanics in inner-cities ghettos--particularly to some behaviors in matters of sexuality, family, school, job and the like. In this way, underclass has found again the ambiguity of cultural definitions of poverty. Though in the recent years social sciences have tried to take it back to the structural phenomenon of persisting poverty, focusing on the "black male joblessness" analysis [Wilson, 1987], they have centered the analysis on inner-cities ghettos and eventually reinforced the association of underclass with the black poor, adding to the concept a further spatial dimension. The emphasis on ghettos' concentration and social isolation as crucial factors of persisting poverty does orient the empirical definition of underclass toward behaviors: being surrounded by other poor can only reinforce behaviors, towards marriage, job, school, and the like. In the end, underclass tells us much less about the suffering of being poor in an advanced society than it tells us about sexuality, family models, job or school refusal, propensity to crime violence and drug abuse. Little by little, the analysis shifts from the causes of poverty to the behaviors of the poor as being the problem.

To resort to class terminology is not enough to restore a picture of poverty socially constructed. Wilson himself likens underclass to the concept of lumpenproletariat that Marx used to describe the slums of 19th Century Britain.

But can behaviors offer a criterium to define a class? what about similar behaviors in other classes, or different behaviors among members of the same class? Moreover, underclass does not refer to any theory of social division, nor tries to build one such theory: the underclass is a class out of the structure of social classes, defined by itself, with no relation to other classes whatsoever. For this reason, it does not allow to conceptualize social stratification, nor explains relations between the social structure and inequality, first of all poverty. Sociologically vague, underclass has all characters of a moral category, and falls into the difficulty of providing with behavioral norms which would not simply reproduce middle-classes standards. The very idea of a class being under all other classes and without a relation to them does reinforce indeed the idea of the poor as being passive, according to a long tradition of moral interpretation of poverty.

Underclass's success comes from being close to common sense: it is a recomforting notion, making poverty the problem of a minority of people, and allowing the analysis to neglect more difficult issues as growing inequality of incomes among working people. But it can only lead to rehabilitating strategies and not to structural reforms of market or redistribution. As L. Mead puts it, since poverty is no longer a question of inequality among classes, "a politics of conduct is today more salient than a politics of class" [Mead, 1991:4]. Underclass has been criticized as an ideological effect of dominant classes [Bagguley & Mann, 1992]. But more than this, underclass helps putting the ghetto poor apart from society, apart from citizenship. Barbara Schmitter-Heisler [1991] remarks that the lack of institutions supporting social citizenship rights, in the US comparatively to European countries, has favored such an exclusion from citizenship.

Recently, Wilson himself has acknowledged that "concerns about civil and political aspects of citizenship in the US have overshadowed concerns about the social aspects of citizenship [...] because of a strong belief system that denies the social origins and social significance of poverty and welfare" [Wilson, 1990:49], and that Americans tend to be more concerned about the social obligations of the poor than about their social rights as American citizens. Welfare programmes in the US have concerned mainly the working and middle classes, and had virtually no effect on the poverty rates among the non-elderly. The same thing can be said of policies enhancing political and civil rights of minority groups, which have benefited above all to small groups of better-trained and educated members of such groups. Therefore, "the economically weakest members of the urban minority population have remained excluded from mainstream society" [58].

After having practically ignored it in his influential book on the underclass, Wilson seems eventually to take into account that *underdeveloped welfare state*

and the *weak institutional structure of social citizenship rights* in the US might have been a cause of economic deprivation and social isolation of the urban poor. As a consequence, he advocates for a development on race-neutral programmes enhancing social rights for all groups, better able to alleviate problems of poor minorities than race-specific measures. He quotes Donald Moon, to state that the aim is to enable "everyone to achieve full membership in the community, and to participate in what a particular society has come to regard as valued and worthwhile ways of living". But this seems rather likely to lead toward eliminating reserved quotas more than any other effect. Class confinement does not seem to be contested: welfare services reserved to the poor will be separated by services for the middle class, Medicaid will continue to pay doctors much less than other insurances, social citizenship rights will be still out of reach.

Wilson crucial contribution to revigorate a pseudo-scientific concept as underclass has reinforced an analytical tendency to stress the limits of citizenship ties, and to define behaviors incompatible to them, that keep the poor out of the realm of citizens. Given the impact that the US debate on poverty has had in Europe in these years of rethinking about European welfare states experience, some similar analytical strategy has taken ground on this side of the Atlantic. The notion of social exclusion (*exclusion sociale*) largely dominates poverty research particularly under the impulsion of European communitarian institutions. In spite of some differences, this notion shows most of the strategical features of underclass. As a matter of fact, it is not as a class that the *exclus* are torn from society. They are indeed a group apart, but the notion of social exclusion is a purely negative one: they have no positivity whatsoever, they represent only a breaking down of the social fabric (*fracture sociale*), they have no common interests, they are not the *nouveaux proletaires* [Rosanvallon, 1995b]. There is no collective identity to describe, only individual trajectories; classification becomes less important, and statistics less telling. So the debate becomes a subjective one as in the States, centered on individual paths and, reciprocally, on personalized treatment, versus the impersonal character of general provisions.

To reduce poverty to a problem of social exclusion might sound a call for re-inclusion into citizenship--and indeed many progressive analysts would pretend it is so. But at the same time, treating them as excluded brings the analysis outside the sphere of the "city". This means that poverty is analysed as a condition on the margins, of drop-outs, and becomes the state in which one lives if one falls outside society, rather than a predicament which can occur within

society--the condition of marginalized people, rather than a process of inequality rooted in the social structure.

But social exclusion is also sociologically significant. It describes a social desegregation, the breaking-point of social relations. Intervention against exclusion must foster social integration (professional, family, community) in an holistic concept of society with all problems of normative models of performing integration. Individual trajectories of marginalization, to which individual trajectories of reintegration do correspond.

Social exclusion does transform a process into a condition, the condition of the excluded. Describes a dual society (ins-outs), and so doing it confirms the break of social relations. It pretends to eject out of society problems producing poverty. Vulnerability, precarity of labor, reduction of resources, weakening of social protections: all processes pushing polarization of society well before falling into extreme poverty.

The kind of policies that social exclusion has implemented are mainly characterized by a turning social problems into *urban problems*, where they take a specific feature of urban structure, that is replacing inequality by segregation [Touraine 1991]. Therefore, the unique meaning of citizenship at work in such policies is *local integration*. Citizenship, or the lack of it, become from this vantage point a question of sociability, at the most of active animation; a culture, an identity, a set of behaviors whose frame is the urban location where the exclusion takes place. Going back to localized treatment of social problems might be a way of reorganizing the social exchange in a more individualistic way, activating reciprocity on a territorial basis, against abstraction of universal rights [Castel 1995:470]. Yet localism also implies a twofold illusion: that contract can be enough for social integration, in spite of long opposite historical evidence, and that decentralization can be a remedy against all evil. Localism does not respond to the resentment of being no longer treated as citizens; it only reinforces the sense of exclusion by pretending that problems of the poor are no longer a collective issue, a public concern.

Amartya Sen's theory of poverty centered on *capabilities* and functionings [1993] is often interpreted as shifting from income-based analyses of poverty to consumption-based analyses. In fact, it does claim much more than just such a shift to a different set of data. In an analysis inevitable relative in terms of income, he introduces anew the idea that there is an absolute component of poverty, in terms of what kind of life one can achieve, that capabilities and functionings express. Poverty is absolute in so far we have chosen a system of values which are important in existence, whatever the relative conditions are. The

most crucial for poverty and citizenship issues is according to Sen to consider participation as such a value, and capability to participate an integral part of well-being impossible to renounce [1992]. He shares with Marshall the conviction that poverty if not inequality has to be eliminated. But participation is exactly what the association of poverty and citizenship issues had been focusing on; in a situation where poverty is more and more the cumulative result of several levels of marginalization growing on themselves, an active defence of social citizenship can only inspire policies aimed to reinforce participation.

b. Individualization of Risk.

Social citizenship is under contest well beyond the debate on poverty issues. Actually, if the status of citizens of the poor appears to be again questionable, the erosion of social citizenship institutions affects social rights in a much more general way. In the critique of the welfare state, citizenship has been considered as expressing the normative ideal of an individual freedom, and therefore being intolerant of social rights and social services, of their administrative organization, of the very idea of universal standards.

Indeed, the crisis involving our social institutions is not just financial, but a more general crisis of social regulations on the all [Gauchet 1993]. The share between universal principles and particularism is no longer assured, and needs to be reformulated. If citizenship bears the meaning of the relationship to the collective body, to a public space, then citizenship is deeply involved in such a crisis--which might explain its overstated presence in social sciences debate. The question is how we interpret such a crisis and what kind of solutions are we trying to imagine to it.

According to Rosanvallon the failure of welfare systems comes from the very search for universal, general criteria of social regulation. "La redéfinition de l'Etat providence passe par cette révolution cognitive [...] il faut aujourd'hui donner congé à l'homme moyen de Quételet et au fait sociologique de Durkheim et rendre aux données leurs valeurs individuelles" [1995b:210]. Among the first effects of such individualization, crucial to the welfare state is the failure of the principle of social insurance having regulated until up to now health and social security. Social insurance has been a mechanism for organizing social solidarity, among people and among generations; its strength came from a historical and political process of socialization of risk and responsibility [Ewald 1986]. It is this process, according to Rosanvallon, which undergoes decomposition nowadays, given the erosion of wage-labor on which it had been focused.

The result would be that social problems are today no more conceived of as a risk, they have become a-cyclical constant components of social life. This provokes a general decrease in uncertainty, which had been, as the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, *the* condition for socializing risk. The only aspect decoded in "social" terms is cost; we share expenses, more than we look for shared services. Accordingly the crisis of welfare systems would come from an individualization of risk, by now exploded in an unlimited number of individual trajectories. This would lead to a civic versus insurance-based organization of welfare, having to find each time a conjonctural rule, no longer universal rules of justice. There is no theoretical solution, only practical solutions; differences become legitimate, risk is only individual, the concept of a victim is nowadays the most adequate, and the agreement on justice rules which have become utterly conventional has to be found each time in the civic community. As a matter of fact, this exhausts also the political plane: politics consists in this constant search for instant rules to redistribute a solidarity for which there is no general principle. This is the basis that Rosanvallon proposes for an "active welfare state". This new political culture aims to overcome the coincidence of social progress with reduction of socio-economic inequalities by developing procedures (*droit procédural*) centered on the principle of "fairness of treatment": to individual trajectories, individualized responses decided through some kind of judicial "case-by-case" agreement.

We land no far from claims leading to a politics of recognition and strategies pursued by those social policies referring to quotas, reverse discrimination, and the like. Interesting enough, no such policies have been implemented toward the poverty problems, they only refer to groups identified by gender, cultural or ethnical differences with respect to mainstream groups dominant in social power. They raise a question not in terms of exclusion-versus-inclusion, but of discrimination in the name of a non-economic, non-social element. Is there no discrimination toward the poor?

It seems that discrimination can be acknowledged only when it does not question in a fundamental way the structure of inequality, but rather only points at the structure of opportunities; and of course, opportunities are not the first concern in dealing with the poor, who by fate seem to have no access to the harvest of opportunities that our societies do promise. The next step of my research will be to explore the rationale for such policies, and the fundamental distinction they seem imply between inequality--as poverty, and difference--as discrimination of minority groups.

It coïncides with the distinction that Nancy Fraser presents in her article between claims referred to identity issues and claims attacking inequality

structure. She describes the political tensions attached to a fight against socio-economic injustice, and the search for group differentiation responding to needs for cultural identity. The interesting point of her analysis, is that she does assume that such a contradiction is ineliminable, since it is experienced by everyone insofar every individual in a modern society has several identities. To find out new political alternatives becomes then inevitable. Contradictory tensions are at work, and always have been, in citizenship as a historical construction and a social fact. They cannot be solved by just eliminating one part of them--namely, social provisions; nor can they be exorcized in order to maximize private freedom and personal responsibility, since there is no evidence no more today than ever that they can be achieved without citizenship entitlements. Tensions rather demand for new answers, both theoretical and political, able to account for the need for new forms of universal principles.

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